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Abstract—We consider a game-theoretic model where individ-
uals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource.
We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in
controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium
when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences,
captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous
prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive
outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects,
utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist
a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization.
We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and
continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that
can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further
show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged
differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players
are charged an identical tax rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale cyber-physical systems form the basis of much
of society’s critical infrastructure [2], and thus must be de-
signed to be resilient to failures and attacks in order to avoid
catastrophic social and economic consequences. While there
are a variety of angles to designing such systems to be more
resilient (including the design of secure control schemes [3],
[4], interconnection topologies [5], [6], and resilient commu-
nication mechanisms [7]), there is an increasing realization
that the resilience of these systems also depends crucially
on the humans that use them [8], [9]. Therefore, in order
to design more resilient socio-cyber-physical systems, it is
critical to understand (in a rigorous mathematical framework)
the decisions made by humans in decentralized and uncertain
environments, and to influence those decisions to obtain better
outcomes for the entire system [9]–[11].
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of human decision-
making on the resiliency of a shared system in a game-
theoretic framework. Game theory has emerged as a natural
framework to investigate the impacts of decentralized decision-
making on the efficiency, security and robustness of large-scale
systems [9], [12]. When the utilities of the decision-makers
or players are uncertain (e.g., due to risk of system failure
or cyber-attack), their risk preferences play a significant role
in shaping their behavior. With the exception of a few recent
papers, most of the existing theoretical literature involving un-
certainty in game-theoretic settings models decision-makers as
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risk neutral (expectation maximizers) or risk averse (expected
utility maximizers with respect to a concave utility function).
However, empirical evidence has shown that the preferences
of human decision-makers systematically deviate from the
preferences of a risk neutral or risk averse decision-maker
[13], [14]. Specifically, humans compare different outcomes
with a reference utility level, and exhibit different attitudes
towards gains and losses. In their Nobel-prize winning work,
Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory [13] in
order to capture these attitudes with appropriately defined
utility and probability weighting functions.1 Prospect theory
has been one of the most widely accepted models of human
decision-making, and has shown its relevance in a broad
range of disciplines [14]–[16], including recent applications
in engineering [17]–[21].
Motivated by the strong empirical and behavioral foun-
dations of prospect theory, we study how to control the
behavior of human decision-makers with prospect-theoretic
utilities in a game-theoretic setting. We consider a broad class
of games where users compete over a shared failure-prone
system. We use the term “resource” to refer to this shared
system to maintain consistency with related game-theoretic
models. Specifically, in our setting, a set of players split their
budget between a safe resource with a constant return and a
shared “common pool” resource (CPR). As total investment
or utilization by all players in the CPR increases, it becomes
more likely for the CPR to fail, in which case the players do
not receive any return from it. If the CPR does not fail, then the
players receive a return per unit investment according to a rate
of return function. Shared resources with increasing rates of
return exhibit so-called network effects [22]; examples include
peer to peer file sharing systems.2 CPRs with decreasing rates
of return model congestion effects and describe engineered
systems such as transportation and communication networks
[25], [26] and natural resources such as fisheries [27]. We
consider CPRs with both network and congestion effects in
this work. In Section III, we further discuss how this general
model captures the externalities present in several applications.
A. Contributions
We study a tax mechanism where each player is charged
a tax amount proportional to her investment in the CPR. A
1The probability weighting function captures the transformation of true
probabilities into perceived probabilities by humans. We do not consider the
impact of probability weighting in this work.
2However, there are instances where authorities have shut down large online
platforms that encourage illegal activities [23], [24]. This is captured by
resource failure in our setting.
2central authority chooses the tax rate to control the utilization
of the shared resource. Analysis of this taxation scheme is
quite challenging under prospect-theoretic preferences. Build-
ing upon the analysis in [28] (where we analyzed users’
equilibrium strategies in the absence of taxation), we first show
that the game admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium (PNE).
We refer to the total investment in the CPR at a PNE as its
utilization, and the failure probability as its fragility.
Our primary goal is to identify conditions under which:
1) there exists a tax rate that achieves a desired (e.g.
socially optimal) level of CPR utilization, and
2) there exists an optimal tax rate that maximizes a con-
tinuous function of the tax rate and utilization (such as
the revenue).
In order to answer these questions, we provide conditions
under which utilization is monotone and continuous in the
tax rate. It is perhaps natural to expect that a higher tax rate
will reduce the utilization in a continuous manner. However,
for CPRs that exhibit network effects, we find that behavioral
risk preferences can sometimes cause utilization (and fragility)
to increase with a higher tax rate. Furthermore, we illustrate
that utilization can be discontinuous as the tax rate increases,
both as a consequence of the shape of the utility function,
and under heterogeneous prospect-theoretic preferences. We
(separately) identify (i) conditions on the CPR characteris-
tics and prospect-theoretic parameters under which utilization
decreases monotonically with tax rate, and (ii) the range
of tax rates under which the utilization varies continuously.
In contrast to CPRs that exhibit network effects, we show
that for CPRs that exhibit congestion effects, utilization is
continuous and monotonically decreasing in the tax rate under
heterogeneous prospect-theoretic preferences of the players.
Building upon these insights, we then identify the range of
utilization that can be achieved via our taxation scheme.
Finally we explore the implications of imposing different
(player-specific) tax rates on the players. We show that im-
posing different tax rates on a set of homogeneous loss averse
players leads to a higher utilization than imposing a uniform
tax rate (equal to the mean of the heterogeneous tax rates).
B. Related work
Within the game-theoretic framework, controlling the re-
source utilization levels through economic incentives such as
taxes and rewards has been studied extensively [29]–[31].
In [29], the authors study how a taxation scheme known as
Pigovian tax improves social welfare at a PNE in a CPR game.
The effect of player-specific tax sensitivities on the price of
anarchy were studied in [30], [32] in the context of nonatomic
congestion games. In contrast, our game formulation is an
instance of atomic splittable congestion games [33]. To the
best of our knowledge, there has been no investigation of the
impact of behavioral risk preferences on users’ strategies under
taxation in congestion or CPR games.
II. PROSPECT THEORY
As discussed in the previous section, our focus is on
behavioral preferences captured by the utility function of
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Fig. 1: Prospect-theoretic utility function (1) with α = 0.5 and
reference point z0 = 0.
prospect theory [13]. Specifically, consider a gamble that has
an outcome with value z ∈ R. A prospect-theoretic individual
perceives its utility in a skewed manner, via the function
v(z, z0) =
{
(z − z0)α, when z ≥ z0
−k(z0 − z)α otherwise,
(1)
where z0 is the reference point, α ∈ (0, 1] is the sensitivity
parameter and k ∈ (0,∞] is referred to as the loss aversion
index. Increase in utility with respect to the reference point
(z ≥ z0) is referred to as a gain and decrease in utility is
referred to as a loss (z < z0).
The parameter α shapes the utility function according to
observed behavior, i.e., the utility function is concave in
the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses.
Accordingly, the decision maker is said to be “risk averse”
in gains and “risk seeking” in losses. As its name indicates,
the parameter k captures loss aversion behavior. Specifically,
when α = 1, a loss of $1 feels like a loss of $k to the player.
A value of k > 1 implies that the individual is loss averse,
while k < 1 implies that the individual is gain seeking. When
the reference point is an exogenous constant, the values k = 1
and α = 1 capture risk neutral behavior. A smaller α implies
greater deviation from risk neutral behavior. The shape of the
value function is shown for different values of k in Figure 1,
with α = 0.5 and z0 = 0.
III. FRAGILE COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAME
We start by introducing the Fragile Common Pool Resource
game [28]. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. Each
player has an endowment or wealth equal to 1 which she
must split between a safe resource and a shared common pool
resource (CPR). We define the strategy of a player i ∈ N
as her investment in the CPR, denoted by xi ∈ [0, 1]. The
total investment by all players in the CPR is denoted by
xT =
∑
i∈N xi. Following conventional notation, we denote
the profile of investments by all players other than i as
x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1. Furthermore, let x¯−i =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i xj , be the
total investment of all players other than i.
Players receive returns on their investments from both re-
sources. The return per unit investment from the safe resource
is normalized to 1, i.e., player i investing 1 − xi in the safe
resource receives a return of 1−xi. The return from the CPR
is subject to risk, captured by a probability of failure p(xT ),
which is a function of the aggregate investment in the CPR. If
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Fig. 2: Central authority sets a tax rate t to control human
utilization of a failure-prone common pool resource (CPR).
the CPR fails, players do not receive any return from it. If the
CPR does not fail, it has a per unit return that is a function
of the total investment xT , denoted by r˜(xT ). In other words,
player i gets xir˜(xT ) from the CPR when it does not fail.
The formulation described above has been studied in many
different contexts.
1) The above formulation was studied as common pool
resource games to model competition over failure-prone
shared resources such as fisheries [27], [34].
2) CPR games, without resource failure, are equivalent to
an instance of atomic splittable congestion games on a
network with two nodes and two parallel links joining
them. One link corresponds to the CPR described above
and the second has a constant delay of 1. This class
of games has been extensively studied in the context of
transportation and communication networks [26], [33].
3) Fragile CPR games are related to the setting in [18],
where players are microgrid operators who decide the
fraction of energy to store for potentially selling at a
higher price in the event of an emergency.3 Both settings
are related if we define the investment of a player as the
fraction of stored energy, and p(xT ) as the probability
that the energy requirement during emergency is smaller
than the total stored energy (i.e., energy price does not
increase and the players incur losses).
4) In resource dilemma games [35], players bid for utilizing
a fraction of a shared resource with unknown size. If the
total demand exceeds the size of the resource, no player
receives any benefit. This model is potentially relevant
when a set of users compete over a shared energy storage
system [36]. This class of games is closely related to
Fragile CPR games where xi is the bid of player i, and
p(xT ) is the distribution of resource size.
Given the breadth of applications where this formulation
arises, the goal of this paper is to understand to what extent
we can control the utilization (xT ) of the resource at the Nash
equilibrium by imposing taxes on players’ investments.
IV. PROSPECT-THEORETIC UTILITY UNDER TAXATION
We first consider the case where a central authority imposes
a uniform tax rate t ≥ 0 per unit investment in the CPR on
the players. Figure 2 represents the schematic of our setting.
3While the authors of [18] model microgrid operators as prospect-theoretic
agents, the utilities are defined quite differently, and their objective is to study
the effects of variations in reference points.
Under this taxation scheme, a player i with investment
xi in the CPR is charged txi as tax. We will consider
the implications of player-specific tax rates in Section IX.
Each player is prospect-theoretic, with a player-specific loss
aversion index ki ∈ R>0 and sensitivity parameter αi ∈ (0, 1].
We define the reference utility of a player i as her utility
when she invests entirely in the safe resource, i.e., chooses
xi = 0. Accordingly, the reference utility is 1 for every
player. Now consider a strategy profile {xj}j∈N with total
investment xT . In the event of CPR failure, each player i
with a nonzero xi experiences a loss −(1 + t)xi, which
comprises of the lost income from not investing xi in the
safe resource, and the tax payment. If the CPR succeeds, the
reference-dependent return is xi(r˜(xT )−1−t), which could be
positive (representing a gain) or negative (representing a loss)
depending on the values of t and xT . For ease of exposition,
we define r(xT ) := r˜(xT )− 1, and henceforth refer to r(xT )
as the rate of return function.
Using the prospect-theoretic utility function (1), player i’s
perception of gains and losses is
ui(xi,x−i) :=


x
αi
i [(max(r(xT ) − t, 0))
αi
−ki(−min(r(xT ) − t, 0))
αi ],w.p. 1− p(xT ),
−ki(1 + t)αix
αi
i ,w.p. p(xT ).
(2)
Player i maximizes the expected utility with respect to the
above utility function given by
E(ui(xi,x−i)) = x
αi
i fi(xT , t), (3)
where
fi(xT , t) :=


(r(xT ) − t)
αi (1− p(xT )) − ki(1 + t)
αip(xT ),
when r(xT )− t ≥ 0,
−ki((t − r(xT ))
αi (1− p(xT )) + (1 + t)
αip(xT )),
otherwise.
(4)
We refer to fi(xT , t) as the effective rate of return of player
i. Figure 3 shows the shapes of fi(xT , t) for different pa-
rameters. We denote this class of Fragile CPR games as
Γ(N , {ui}i∈N ). In this paper, we consider Fragile CPR games
that satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The class of Fragile CPR games
Γ(N , {ui}i∈N ) has the following properties.
1) The failure probability p(xT ) is convex, strictly increas-
ing and continuously differentiable for xT ∈ [0, 1) and
p(xT ) = 1 for xT ≥ 1.
2) The rate of return r(xT ) is concave, positive, strictly
monotonic and continuously differentiable.
3) Define
t¯ := sup{t ≥ 0|max
i∈N
max
xT∈[0,1]
fi(xT , t) > 0}. (5)
We assume that t¯ > 0, and the tax rate t ∈ [0, t¯).
These assumptions capture a fairly broad class of resources,
while retaining analytical tractability.
To explain the third point in Assumption 1, note from the
definition of t¯ that for any tax rate t ≥ t¯, the effective rate of
return is nonpositive for every player and every xT ∈ [0, 1].
Accordingly, all players have expected utility equal to 0 at
any PNE. On the other hand, for t < t¯, there exist player(s)
who make a nonzero investment at the PNE. Furthermore, at a
PNE with nonzero CPR investments, the total investment must
4be such that r(xT ) − t ≥ 0 (from (4), we have fi(xT , t) ≥
0 =⇒ r(xT ) − t ≥ 0). Accordingly, most of our analysis
will focus on the range of total investments that lie within a
subset St ⊆ [0, 1] such that r(xT )− t ≥ 0 for xT ∈ St. When
r(xT ) is strictly decreasing, we have St := [0, bt], where
bt :=
{
1, if r(1) ≥ t,
r−1(t), if r(1) < t,
(6)
where r−1(t) = {y ∈ [0, 1]|r(y) = t}. On the other hand,
when r(xT ) is strictly increasing, we have St := [at, 1], where
at :=
{
0, if r(0) ≥ t,
r−1(t), if r(0) < t.
(7)
Note that for t ∈ [0, t¯], St is well defined and is nonempty.
Remark 1: The taxation scheme introduced here can be
viewed as a subsidy on the safe resource (which increases
the rate of return of the safe resource to 1+ t). The reference-
dependent utility under this subsidy is identical to (2). Such a
subsidy scheme was studied in [29].
In the following section, we investigate the existence and
uniqueness of PNE in Fragile CPR games under taxes.
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed tax rate t ∈ [0, t¯).
We define the best response correspondence of a player i
as Bi(x−i) := argmaxxi∈[0,1] Eui(xi,x−i), where Eui(·)
is defined in (3). While Eui(xi,x−i) is not concave in
xi ∈ [0, 1], we will show that Bi(·) is single-valued and
continuous in x−i. We start with the following lemma. While
the proof largely follows from identical arguments as the proof
of Lemma 1 in [28] (where we considered Fragile CPR games
without taxation), we present it here as the proof formally
defines several important quantities that are useful in the
analysis throughout the paper. Recall that x¯−i denotes the total
investment by all players other than i.
Lemma 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed tax
rate t ∈ [0, t¯). Then, for any player i, the following are true.
1) There exists a unique yti ∈ [0, 1], such that 0 is a unique
best response for player i if and only if x¯−i ≥ yti .
2) When yti > 0, fi(y
t
i , t) = 0, and there exists an interval
Iti ⊆ [0, y
t
i) ⊂ St such that if x¯−i < y
t
i , then each best
response bi ∈ Bi(x−i) (i) is positive, and (ii) satisfies
bi + x¯−i ∈ Iti .
3) For xT ∈ Iti , we have fi(xT , t) > 0 and fi,x(xT , t) :=
∂fi(xT ,t)
∂xT
< 0.
Proof: We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: r(xT ) is decreasing. From the definition of bt
(equation (6)), we obtain fi(bt, t) < 0 in (4). Straightforward
calculation shows that fi(xT , t) is strictly decreasing in xT
when xT ∈ [0, bt]. If fi(0, t) ≤ 0, we define yti = 0.
On the other hand, if fi(0, t) > 0, we define y
t
i ∈ St as
the unique investment where fi(y
t
i , t) = 0. If x¯−i ≥ y
t
i , any
nonzero investment ǫ by player i will lead to fi(ǫ+ x¯−i, t) <
0, and consequently a strictly negative utility. Therefore,
Bi(x−i) = {0} in this case. On the other hand, if x¯−i < yti ,
there exists δ > 0 such that δ + x¯−i < y
t
i , and therefore,
fi(δ + x¯−i, t) > 0. Therefore, the interval Iti := [0, y
t
i) has
the desired properties.
Case 2: r(xT ) is increasing. If fi(xT , t) ≤ 0 for xT ∈
[at, 1], we define y
t
i = 0, and Bi(x−i) := {0} for every x−i.
Now suppose there exists xT ∈ [at, 1] where fi(xT , t) > 0.
Straightforward calculation shows that fi(xT , t) is strictly
concave in xT when xT ∈ [at, 1]. Therefore, there ex-
ists a unique maximizer of fi(xT , t) given by z
t
i :=
argmaxxT∈[at,1] fi(xT , t). Note that we must have z
t
i < 1
since fi(1, t) < 0. From the strict concavity of fi, we have
fi,x(xT , t) :=
∂fi(xT ,t)
∂xT
< 0 for xT > z
t
i . Thus, there exists
a unique investment yti ∈ (z
t
i , 1) such that fi(y
t
i , t) = 0. We
argue that yti , and I
t
i := (z
t
i , y
t
i) have the desired properties;
Iti satisfies the third property by definition.
Now suppose the total investment by players other than i
satisfies x¯−i ≥ yti . Then any xi > 0 would imply fi(xi +
x¯−i) < 0, and 0 is the unique best response. On the other hand,
if x¯−i < y
t
i , there exists δ > 0 such that fi(δ+ x¯−i) > 0, and
thus, all best responses must be positive. Note that we must
necessarily have δ + x¯−i > at. Now suppose x
∗
i ∈ Bi(x−i).
Then it must necessarily satisfy the first order condition of
optimality
∂E(ui)
∂xi
= 0 for the utility in (3), leading to
x∗i fi,x(x
∗
i + x¯−i, t) + αifi(x
∗
i + x¯−i, t) = 0. (8)
Since fi(x
∗
i +x¯−i, t) > 0, we must have fi,x(x
∗
i +x¯−i, t) < 0,
and therefore, x∗i + x¯−i ∈ I
t
i .
Remark 2: Figure 3 illustrates the quantities introduced in
the above lemma; the subscript i is dropped for convenience.
Figure 3a shows that y0 = 0.8359 and y1 = 0.6166 for a
CPR with decreasing rate of return. Note from the figure that
f(yt, t) = 0 in both cases. Figure 3b and 3c show the values
of yti and z
t
i for a CPR with r(xT ) = 3xT + 1 and p(xT ) =
0.2 + 0.8x4T for different tax rates and risk preferences. Note
from the figures that zti is the maximizer of fi(xT , t), and
fi(y
t
i , t) = 0. The kinks in the last two figures occur at the
respective at values.
We now build upon the above discussion, and introduce a
few other important quantities. For a player i, we define
gi(xT , t) :=
αifi(xT , t)
−fi,x(xT , t)
, xT ∈ St. (9)
It follows from the first order optimality condition in (8)
that a nonzero best response x∗i ∈ Bi(x−i) satisfies x
∗
i =
gi(x
∗
i + x¯−i, t). Note that gi(xT , t) is a natural extension of
the function g(xT ) defined in [28]. Accordingly, at a fixed tax
rate t, we have the following result on the monotonicity of the
function gi(xT , t) with respect to xT .
Lemma 2: For xT ∈ Iti , we have
∂gi(xT ,t)
∂xT
< 0 .
The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4 in [28], and
thus we omit it. However, gi(xT , t) is not always decreasing
in t as we will explore later. As a consequence of the above
two lemmas, we have the following result.
Proposition 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with a fixed
tax rate rate t satisfying Assumption 1. Then there exists a
unique PNE of the game.
Proof: In Lemma 1, we showed that when a player i has
a nonzero best response, the total investment in the CPR lies
in the interval Iti . When xT ∈ St, the rate of return function is
monotone, concave and positive. Therefore, the results on the
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Fig. 3: Shapes of the effective rate of return function under different CPR characteristics and risk preferences.
uniqueness and continuity of best responses from Lemma 2
and 3 in [28] carry over to the present setting under taxation.
As a consequence of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [37], a
PNE exists. The uniqueness of PNE follows the monotonicity
of nonzero best responses shown in Lemma 2; its proof follows
identical arguments as the proof of Theorem 1 in [28].
At a given tax rate t, we denote the total investment in
the CPR at corresponding PNE as xt
NE
, and refer to it as
the utilization (of the CPR). Furthermore, we refer to the
corresponding failure probability p(xt
NE
) as its fragility. We
now define the support of a PNE.
Definition 1: The support of the PNE of the game Γ, denoted
Supp(Γ), is the set of players who have a nonzero investment
in the CPR. In particular, by Lemma 1, Supp(Γ) := {i ∈
N|xt
NE
< yti}.
Accordingly, the total investment at the PNE satisfies
xt
NE
=
∑
i∈Supp(Γ)
gi(x
t
NE
, t). (10)
From our earlier discussion, we have xT ∈ Iti for i ∈
Supp(Γ). Therefore, for increasing rate of return functions,
xt
NE
> zti for every i ∈ Supp(Γ), since I
t
i = (z
t
i , y
t
i) for such
functions from the proof of Lemma 1.
We conclude this section with two lemmas that will be use-
ful in several proofs later in the paper, and a brief discussion
on the social welfare. The first shows the monotonicity of zti
in t for certain risk preferences.
Lemma 3: Consider a CPR game with increasing r(xT ),
and a player i with αi = 1, and let t2 < t1 < t¯. If ki < 1,
then zt2i ≤ z
t1
i , and vice versa.
Proof:When xT ∈ St, the effective rate of return function
in (4) for player i is given by
fi(xT , t) = r(xT )(1−p(xT ))−kp(xT )−t(k−1)p(xT ). (11)
Let zt2i > at1 > 0; otherwise the result follows directly.
According to the first order optimality condition for zti , we
have fi,x(z
t2
i , t2) =
∂fi
∂xT
(zt2i , t2) = 0. Since ki < 1, and
p(xT ) is strictly increasing, it is easy to see that fi,x(z
t2
i , t1) >
0 implying zt2i ≤ z
t1
i . The same reasoning applies to the
converse.
Observe that in Figure 3b, zti is indeed increasing in t in
accordance with the above lemma. Now, let Γ1 and Γ2 be
two instances of Fragile CPR games with identical resource
characteristics and tax rates t1 and t2, respectively. Let the
respective total PNE investments be xt1
NE
and xt2
NE
. We prove the
following result which holds for CPRs with both increasing
and decreasing r(xT ).
Lemma 4: If t1 > t2, we have y
t1
i ≤ y
t2
i for every player
i with αi ∈ (0, 1] and ki > 0. In addition, if t1 > t2 and
xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
, we have Supp(Γ1) ⊆ Supp(Γ2).
Proof: Let maxx∈St1 fi(x, t1) > 0; otherwise y
t1
i = 0,
and the first statement trivially holds. When yt1i > 0, it follows
from Lemma 1 that fi(y
t1
i , t1) = 0. When t2 < t1, it is
easy to see (from (6) and (7)) that St1 ⊆ St2 . Furthermore,
note from (4) that fi is decreasing in the second argument
t for both increasing and decreasing rate of return functions.
Accordingly, fi(y
t1
i , t2) > 0, and therefore, y
t1
i ≤ y
t2
i .
For the second part of proof, let j ∈ Supp(Γ1). From
Definition 1, we have
xt1
NE
< yt1j =⇒ x
t2
NE
< xt1
NE
< yt1j ≤ y
t2
i .
As a result, j ∈ Supp(Γ2). This concludes the proof.
As discussed in the introduction, one of the key motivations
behind this work is to understand conditions under which
a socially desirable level of utilization can be achieved via
taxation. In the context of congestion games and CPR games,
the metric that is often used to capture a socially desired level
of utilization is the resource utilization that maximizes the
sum of utilities of all players in the absence of taxation (also
referred to as the social welfare) [30], [31], [38]. The following
result shows that the CPR utilization and fragility are higher
at the PNE compared to their counterparts at a social welfare
maximizing strategy profile.
Proposition 2: Let xOPT = (x1,OPT, x2,OPT, . . . , xn,OPT) ∈
[0, 1]N be a set of investments that maximizes Ψ(x) :=∑
i∈N Eui(xi, x−i) at t = 0. Then, the resulting total CPR
investment at the social optimum is at most the total CPR
investment at the PNE, i.e., x0
OPT
≤ x0
NE
.
The result holds under heterogeneous prospect-theoretic
preferences of the users. We refer to Appendix A for the proof.
In order to answer questions such as the existence of a tax rate
that achieves x0
OPT
, we now investigate whether utilization, as
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Fig. 4: Non-monotonicity of fragility w.r.t. tax rate (k = 1.2
and α = 0.15)
a function of the tax rate, is well behaved, i.e., whether it is
monotonically decreasing and continuous.
VI. MONOTONICITY OF UTILIZATION UNDER TAXATION
We now investigate whether the total investment xt
NE
at the
PNE (i.e., the utilization of the CPR) is monotone in t. Note
from (3) that the utility of a player in a game with a tax rate
t is equivalent to that in a game without taxes, but with a
smaller rate of return function (r(xT )− t), and a larger index
of loss aversion (ki(1+t)
αi ). Therefore, intuition suggests that
an increase in tax rate would lead to smaller utilization. We
start this section by showing that this is not always the case
for CPRs with increasing r(xT ) and under prospect theory.
A. Monotonicity of utilization under network effects (or lack
thereof)
Recall that online platforms such as peer to peer file sharing
systems are instances of CPRs that exhibit network effects. In
the following example, we show that imposing a higher tax
rate can lead to higher utilization and fragility.
Example 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with n = 3
players. Let r(xT ) = 8xT +5 and p(xT ) = xT . Let α = 0.15
and k = 1.2 for all players, i.e., all players are loss averse, and
the deviation from risk neutral behavior (α = 1 and k = 1) is
significant. As shown in Figure 4, when t increases from 0 to
4.9, the fragility is not monotonically decreasing.
Recall from Figure 1 that α < 1 gives rise to risk seeking
behavior in losses and risk averse behavior in gains. When
the value of α approaches 0, the modified loss aversion index
k(1 + t)α does not increase by much at a higher tax rate.
This encourages players to increase their investment into the
CPR. Such behavior is not limited to the case when α is very
small. In the conference version of this paper [1], we provided
additional examples where a higher tax rate leads to higher
utilization when the index of loss aversion is smaller than 1.
In both instances, players increase their investments to receive
a higher return and compensate for the tax payment (at the
cost of increased risk of resource failure).
We now obtain a sufficient condition under which a higher
tax rate does indeed lead to smaller utilization; a central
authority can check this condition, and avoid the counter
productive outcome observed in the previous subsection.
Recall that at ∈ [0, 1) is the unique investment such that
r(at) = t. For t ∈ [0, t¯), xT ∈ (at, 1], let
qi(xT , t) :=
r′(xT )(1− p(xT ))2
(r(xT ) + 1)p′(xT )− αir′(xT )(1− p(xT ))p(xT )
×
(
1 + t
r(xT )− t
)1−αi
. (12)
The following lemma proves a few useful properties of this
function.
Lemma 5: The function qi(·, ·) defined above has the
following properties.
1) Let xT ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ {t ≥ 0|xT ∈ (at, 1]}. If ki >
qi(xT , t), then
∂gi(xT ,t)
∂t
< 0.
2) Let xT ∈ Iti . Then, the denominator of qi(·, ·) is
positive. Specifically, (r(xT ) + 1)p
′(xT ) > (r(xT ) −
t)p′(xT ) > αir
′(xT )(1 − p(xT ))p(xT ).
3) For xT ∈ (at, 1], qi(xT , t) is strictly decreasing in xT .
The proof is presented in Appendix B. We are now ready
to prove the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 3: Consider a Fragile CPR game with increas-
ing r(xT ). Let t2 < t1 < t¯ with x
t2
NE
> at1 . Suppose
ki > qi(x
t2
NE
, t1) for every player i, where qi(·, ·) is defined
in (12). Then, xt1
NE
≤ xt2
NE
.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
> 0.
According to Lemma 4, we have Supp(Γ1) ⊆ Supp(Γ2).
From the characterization of PNE in equation (10), we obtain
xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
=⇒
∑
j∈Supp(Γ1)
gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) >
∑
j∈Supp(Γ2)
gj(x
t2
NE
, t2)
=⇒
∑
j∈Supp(Γ1)
gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) >
∑
j∈Supp(Γ1)
gj(x
t2
NE
, t2). (13)
In the remainder of the proof, our goal is to contradict the
inequality in equation (13). In particular, for each player j ∈
Supp(Γ1), we show that gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t2
NE
, t2).
Consider a player j ∈ Supp(Γ1). From Lemma 1, x
t1
NE
<
yt1j . Furthermore, from Lemma 4, we have y
t1
j ≤ y
t2
j . Together
with our assumption, we obtain
xt2
NE
< xt1
NE
< yt1j ≤ y
t2
j =⇒ [x
t2
NE
, xt1
NE
] ⊂ It2j .
From the monotonicity of gj(xT , t) in xT in Lemma 2, we
obtain gj(x
t1
NE
, t2) < gj(x
t2
NE
, t2).
It is now sufficient to show that gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t1
NE
, t2).
Since xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
> at1 , part three of Lemma 5 yields
qj(x
t2
NE
, t1) > qj(x
t1
NE
, t1).
Furthermore, from its definition, qj(x, t) is strictly increasing
in t. Thus, for t ∈ [t2, t1],
qj(x
t1
NE
, t1) > qj(x
t1
NE
, t);
note that xt1
NE
> at1 ≥ at for t ∈ [t2, t1]. Combining these
observations, we obtain
kj > qj(x
t2
NE
, t1) > qj(x
t1
NE
, t1) > qj(x
t1
NE
, t)
=⇒
∂gj(x
t1
NE
, t)
∂t
< 0,
for t ∈ [t2, t1] (following the first part of Lemma 5). Therefore,
gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t1
NE
, t2), which contradicts (13).
7The above result establishes a condition that we can check
to ensure that a higher tax rate will lead to smaller utilization.
All else being equal, if players become more loss averse (i.e.,
as ki increases), it becomes more likely that the condition
ki > qi(xT , t) is satisfied. Furthermore, when all players have
identical α, we only need to check the condition for the player
with the smallest loss aversion index.4
When α = 1, q(xT , t) is independent of t from (12). We
now obtain the following result.
Proposition 4: Consider a Fragile CPR game with increasing
r(xT ). Let α = 1 and k ≥ 1 for every player. Let t2 < t1 < t¯.
Then, xt1
NE
≤ xt2
NE
.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
. Following
analogous arguments as the first part of the proof of Propo-
sition 3, it suffices to show that for a player j ∈ Supp(Γ1),
gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t1
NE
, t2).
Note that xt1
NE
> at1 ≥ at2 . Therefore, fj(x
t1
NE
, t) is defined
for t ∈ [t2, t1]. Since αj = 1, we have
fj(xT , t) = (r(xT )− t)(1− p(xT ))− kj(1 + t)p(xT ), and
fj,x(xT , t) =
∂fj
∂xT
(xT , t) = r
′(xT )(1 − p(xT ))
− r(xT )p
′(xT )− kjp
′(xT )− tp
′(xT )(kj − 1).
It is easy to see that
∂fj
∂t
(xt1
NE
, t) < 0. Furthermore, when kj ≥
1,
∂2fj
∂xT ∂t
(xt1
NE
, t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [t2, t1]. Therefore, gj(x
t1
NE
, t) is
decreasing in t for t ∈ [t2, t1]. The result now follows from
identical arguments as the proof of Proposition 3.
The above result states that when users have αj = 1,
and are risk neutral or loss averse (i.e., have kj ≥ 1), a
higher tax rate leads to smaller CPR utilization. Therefore,
the lack of monotonicity observed in the earlier examples is a
consequence of prospect-theoretic risk preferences.
B. Monotonicity of utilization under congestion effects
In contrast with the observations in the above subsection,
for resources with a decreasing r(xT ), we show here that an
increase of tax rate always leads to smaller utilization of the
CPR. The result holds when ki ∈ R>0 and αi ∈ (0, 1] are
player-specific, and potentially heterogeneous.
We start with the following useful lemma, which holds for
the general form of the utility function (4) with αi ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 6: Let xT ∈ [0, 1]. For a player j, let T
xT
j := {t ∈
[0, t¯)|fj(xT , t) > 0}. Let gj(xT , t) be the function defined in
(9). Then,
∂gj(xT ,t)
∂t
< 0 for t ∈ T xTj .
In other words, at a given utilization level xT , the function
gj(xT , t) is strictly decreasing in the tax rate t over the range
of tax rates at which the effective rate of return remains
positive. The proof is presented in Appendix B. We are now
ready the state the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 5: Consider a Fragile CPR game with decreas-
ing r(xT ). Let 0 ≤ t2 < t1 < t¯. Then, x
t1
NE
≤ xt2
NE
.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
.
From Lemma 4, we have Supp(Γ1) ⊆ Supp(Γ2), where
Supp(Γk), k ∈ {1, 2} is the support of the PNE at tax rate
4In [28], we showed that when players have identical α, the player in the
smallest loss aversion index always has the largest investment at the PNE.
tk. Following identical arguments as the proof of Proposition
3, we obtain∑
j∈Supp(Γ1)
gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) >
∑
j∈Supp(Γ1)
gj(x
t2
NE
, t2). (14)
We obtain a contradiction to the above equation as follows.
Consider a player j ∈ Supp(Γ1). Then x
t1
NE
∈ It1j , where
It1j is the interval defined in Lemma 1; in particular, when x ∈
It1j , we have fj(x, t1) > 0 and fj,x(x, t1) < 0. When r(x)
is decreasing in x, and xt1
NE
> xt2
NE
, then xt2
NE
∈ It1j . Therefore,
from Lemma 2, we have gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t2
NE
, t1).
Since xt2
NE
∈ It1j , we have fj(x
t2
NE
, t1) > 0. Since fj(x, t) is
also decreasing in t, fj(x
t2
NE
, t) > 0 for t ∈ [t2, t1]. From
Lemma 6, we obtain gj(x
t2
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t2
NE
, t2). Thus, for
every player j ∈ Supp(Γ1), gj(x
t1
NE
, t1) < gj(x
t2
NE
, t2), which
contradicts (14).
Recall that we want to characterize the set of total invest-
ments that can be achieved at a PNE via taxation. In order to
answer this question, we now investigate whether utilization
varies as a continuous function of the tax rate.
VII. CONTINUITY OF UTILIZATION UNDER TAXATION
A. Continuity of utilization under network effects (or lack
thereof)
We start with a few numerical examples to illustrate how
utilization can be discontinuous in the tax rate. We discuss the
mathematical intuition behind such discontinuities, followed
by identifying conditions (on the prospect-theoretic prefer-
ences) under which utilization remains continuous.
First consider a player i who is risk neutral (i.e., αi = 1
and ki = 1). For such a player i, the effective rate of return
(4) is given by
fi(xT , t) = r(xT )(1− p(xT ))− p(xT )− t.
Therefore, for such a player, zti := argmaxxT∈[at,1] fi(xT , t)
is independent of t. Now suppose zti = z
0
i > 0. If at a PNE,
player i has a nonzero investment, then the utilization xt
NE
>
zti . In the following example, we show that as t exceeds t¯,
fi(z
t
i , t) becomes negative, and x
t
NE
drops abruptly to 0.
Example 2: Consider a Fragile CPR game with two risk
neutral players. Let p(xT ) = 0.2+0.8x
4
T and r(xT ) = 3xT +
1. Note that t¯ = 1.655, i.e., maxxT∈[0,1] f(xT , t¯) = 0. In
Figure 5a, we show how utilization xt
NE
decreases as t increases
(in accordance with Proposition 4); there is a discontinuity at t¯
where xt
NE
drops from 0.5665 to 0. The socially optimal level
of utilization in the absence of taxes is x0
OPT
= 0.6829. For
t ∈ [0, t¯), xt
NE
is monotone, continuous and as t ↑ t¯ (i.e., t
approaches t¯ from below), xt
NE
→ z t¯i = 0.5665. Therefore,
there exists a tax rate t∗ such that xt
∗
NE
= x0
OPT
.
In the following example, we show that when players exhibit
gain seeking behavior (i.e., k < 1), there are instances where
the socially optimal utilization cannot be achieved.
Example 3: Consider a Fragile CPR game with p(xT ) =
0.2 + 0.8x4T , and r(xT ) = 3xT + 1 as before. We consider
homogeneous players with α = 1, k = 0.05. Recall that the
shape of f(xT , t) for these parameters were shown in Figure
3b for different values of tax rates. Note from Figure 3b that
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in the tax rate, but there exists a tax rate
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Fig. 5: Illustration of discontinuity of utilization in the tax rate under network effects and prospect-theoretic preferences.
t¯ = 3.21. Furthermore, consistent with Lemma 3, zt increases
from 0.6083 to 0.8541 as t increases from 0 to t¯.
As shown in Figure 5b for n = 2, xt
NE
increases continu-
ously as t increases unitl t¯, and then drops to 0. On the other
hand, when n = 8, xt
NE
is decreasing in t, and once again,
has a discontinuous jump at t¯. As discussed earlier, xt
NE
> zt
at every tax rate. The socially optimal total investment in the
absence of taxes x0
OPT
= 0.7351 is not achieved at any tax rate
as shown in the figure.
In the above two examples with homogeneous players,
xt
NE
remained continuous for t ∈ [0, t¯). We now show that
heterogeneity in prospect-theoretic preferences can induce
discontinuity at tax rates smaller than t¯.
Example 4: Consider a Fragile CPR game with p(xT ) =
0.2+0.8x4T and r(xT ) = 3xT +1, as before. Let there be two
players, with prospect-theoretic parameters α1 = 1, k1 = 1.1
and α2 = 0.3, k2 = 1.5. In this case, t¯ = 2.19. Figure
3c showed the respective effective rates of return under
these parameters at t = 1.583. Note from Figure 3c that
maxxT∈St f1(xT , 1.583) = 0, i.e., for tax rates larger than
1.583, player 1 will invest 0 at the equilibrium. Accordingly,
for t < 1.583, xt
NE
is larger than zt1.
Figure 5c shows that for t < 1.583, player 1 has a larger
investment than player 2. As t becomes slightly larger than
1.583, the investment by player 1 drops to 0, while player 2
increases her investment. However, the total investment has a
discontinuous jump from 0.5612 to 0.4667. As t increases
from 1.583 to 2.19, the investment by player 2 increases
continuously, and at t = 2.19, her investment drops to 0.
Motivated by the above observations, we now identify
conditions under which xt
NE
is continuous in t. With a minor
abuse of notation, we denote xt
NE
as a function of t, i.e., we
define xNE : [0, t¯)→ [0, 1] such that xNE(t) := xtNE.
Now consider a player i in a Fragile CPR game with increas-
ing r(xT ). Define t¯i := sup{t ≥ 0|maxxT∈St fi(xT , t) > 0},
i.e., t¯i is the highest tax rate such that player i makes a nonzero
investment in the CPR when investing in isolation. We are now
ready to state the main continuity result.
Proposition 6: The function xNE : [0, t¯)→ [0, 1] is continu-
ous in t for t ∈ [0,mini∈N t¯i).
The proof is presented in Appendix C. We largely rely
on Berge’s maximum theorem [37], also stated formally in
Appendix C.
The result states that utilization remains continuous over
a subset of tax rates for which utilization is nonzero. Recall
that in Example 4, t¯1 = 1.583, while t¯2 = 2.19. As shown
in Figure 5c, utilization is continuous for t ∈ [0, 1.583) in
accordance with the above result, and has a discontinuous
jump at t = 1.583. Several important consequences of this
result will be discussed in the next section.
B. Continuity of utilization under congestion effects
We now show that for CPRs with decreasing rate of return
functions, the total investment at the PNE is continuous in t
for t ∈ [0, t¯], i.e., the entire range of tax rates with nonzero
utilization. Our analysis relies on Berge’s maximum theorem.
In order to apply Berge’s maximum theorem, we need to
express the total PNE investment xt
NE
as the unique maximizer
of a function that is jointly continuous in the total investment
and the tax rate.
First we define the following function. For a player i, xT ∈
[0, 1] and t ∈ [0, t¯), let
gˆi(xT , t) :=
{
αifi(xT ,t)
−fi,x(xT ,t)
, xT ∈ [0, yti)
0, otherwise.
(15)
Note that gˆi(xT , t) is bounded
5, and therefore well-defined. In
the following lemma, we prove the (joint) continuity of gˆi(·, ·).
Lemma 7: The function gˆi(xT , t), xT ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, t¯)
defined in (15) is jointly continuous in xT and t.
Proof: First observe that at a given t, gˆi(xT , t) is contin-
uous and monotone in xT for xT ∈ [0, 1]; since fi(yti , t) = 0,
we have gˆi(y
t
i , t) = 0, and the monotonicity follows from
Lemma 2. Following [39], it now suffices to show that
gˆi(xT , t) is continuous in t at a given xT .
Since fi(xT , t) is strictly decreasing in t, the condition xT ∈
[0, yti) is equivalent to t ∈ [0, tˆ
xT
i ), where tˆ
xT
i := min{t ∈
[0, t¯] : fi(xT , t) ≤ 0}. For t ∈ [0, tˆ
xT
i ), gˆi(xT , t) is continuous
in t as both numerator and denominator are continuous in t.
5For xT ∈ [0, 1], and nonempty T
xT
j := {t ∈ [0, t¯)|fj(xT , t) > 0},
Lemma 6 shows that
∂gj(xT ,t)
∂t
< 0 for t ∈ T
xT
j . In this case,
αifi(xT ,t)
−fi,x(xT ,t)
<
αifi(xT ,0)
−fi,x(xT ,0)
. Furthermore, fi,x(xT , 0) (with expression
(20) in Appendix B) is strictly smaller than 0 under Assumption 1.
9For t ≥ tˆxTi , gˆi(xT , t) = 0. Furthermore, when tˆ
xT
i > 0,
fi(xT , tˆ
xT
i ) = 0. Thus, gˆi(xT , t) is continuous in t at a given
xT ∈ [0, 1].
We now show that the total PNE investment can be stated
as a maximizer of a function that is continuous in both the
total investment and the tax rate.
Lemma 8: Define
hC(xT , t) := −[xT −
∑
i∈N
gˆi(xT , t)]
2, xT ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, t¯).
Then, at a given t, argmaxxT∈[0,1] h
C(xT , t) is single-valued,
and is equal to xt
NE
.
The proof follows from identical arguments as the proof of
Lemma 11 in Appendix C, and is omitted.
As before, let xNE : [0, t¯) → [0, 1] such that xNE(t) := xtNE.
We are now ready to prove the following result.
Proposition 7: The function xNE : [0, t¯]→ [0, 1] is continu-
ous in t for t ∈ [0, t¯].
Proof: Consider a set-valued map or correspondence
C : [0, t¯)⇒ [0, 1] such that C(t) = [0, 1] for every t ∈ [0, t¯).
From its definition, C is compact-valued, and is both upper
and lower hemicontinuous at every t ∈ [0, t¯). From Lemma 7,
hC(xT , t) is jointly continuous in xT and t. Following Berge’s
maximum theorem (see Appendix C), the set-valued map
argmaxxT∈C(t) h
C(xT , t) is upper hemicontinuous. From
Lemma 8, we have argmaxxT∈C(t) h
C(xT , t) = {xNE(t)}, i.e.,
the set-valued map is in fact single-valued. Therefore, xNE(t)
is continuous in t for t ∈ [0, t¯).
We now show that xNE(t) is continuous at t = t¯. From the
strict monotonicity and continuity of f(·, ·) and the definition
of t¯, we have maxi∈N fi(0, t¯) = 0. Therefore, xNE(t¯) = 0.
Now, recall from Lemma 1 and Definition 1 that xNE(t) <
maxi∈N y
t
i at any tax rate t. Furthermore, as t ↑ t¯, we have
max
i∈N
fi(0, t)→ 0 =⇒ max
i∈N
yti → 0 =⇒ xNE(t)→ 0.
This concludes the proof.
Our results on the monotonicity and continuity of utilization
have several implications which we discuss below.
VIII. MAIN RESULTS
Recall from the introduction that our goal is to characterize
the range of utilizations (including the socially optimal level of
utilization x0
OPT
) that can be achieved at the PNE by a suitable
choice of tax rate. We answer this question in this section.
A. CPRs with network effects
Our analysis on the monotonicity and continuity of utiliza-
tion leads to the following theorem. Recall that t¯i := sup{t ≥
0|maxxT∈St fi(xT , t) > 0}.
Theorem 1: Consider a Fragile CPR game with increasing
r(xT ), and player-specific prospect-theoretic preferences.
• For all continuous functions w(xNE(t), t) and δ > 0,
there exists a t∗ ∈ [0,mini∈N t¯i − δ] that maximizes
w(xNE(t), t).
• Let j := argmini∈N t¯i, and let x¯j := limt↑t¯j z
t
j . If x
0
NE
>
x¯j (respectively, x
0
NE
< x¯j), then for any given level of
utilization x∗ ∈ (x¯j , x0NE] (respectively, x
∗ ∈ [x0
NE
, x¯j))
there exists a tax rate t such that x∗ = xt
NE
.
• If x¯j < x
0
OPT
, then there exists a tax rate t∗ such that
xt
∗
NE
= x0
OPT
.
Proof: The first statement follows from Proposition 6 and
the extreme value theorem. For the second part, note from
the definition of t¯i that it is the smallest tax rate at which
the maximum value of fi(xT , t¯i) = 0, xT ∈ St¯i . From the
definitions of zti and y
t
i , we have limt↑t¯i z
t
i = limt↑t¯i y
t
i .
The second statement now follows from Proposition 6, and
intermediate value theorem. The third statement now follows
from Proposition 2 which states that x0
OPT
≤ x0
NE
.
Remark 3: Recall that in Example 2, x¯j = 0.5665 <
0.6829 = x0
OPT
. As shown in Figure 5a, there exists a tax
rate at which PNE utilization equals x0
OPT
in accordance with
Theorem 1. On the other hand, in Example 3, x¯j = 0.8541 >
0.7351 = x0
OPT
. While xt
NE
is continuous in t ∈ [0, t¯) following
Proposition 6, there does not exist a tax rate that achieves x0
OPT
as shown in Figure 5b.
We now describe several important implications of the
above result for special cases of prospect-theoretic preferences.
When all players have identical α, the player with the
largest loss aversion index has the smallest t¯i. When all
players have identical α and k, t¯i is identical for every
player, and thus t¯ = mini∈N t¯i. Thus, the conclusions of the
above result holds over the entire range of tax rates under
which PNE utilization is nonzero. Finally, let all players have
homogeneous preferences with α = 1 and k ≥ 1. Recall that
in this case, their utilities are linear or piecewise concave, and
reflects risk neutral or risk averse preferences. We have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: Let all players have α = 1 and k ≥ 1. Then
there exists a tax rate t∗ such that xt
∗
NE
= x0
OPT
.
Proof: From Lemma 3, we know that as the tax rate
increases, zt decreases for every player. Furthermore, from
Proposition 4 in our prior work [28], x0
OPT
is equal to the
investment by a single player when she invests in isolation.
Therefore, x¯ = limt↑t¯ z
t < z0 < x0
OPT
. The result now follows
from Theorem 1.
B. CPRs with congestion effects
The counterpart of the above result is much stronger for
CPRs with congestion effects, and is stated below.
Theorem 2: Consider a Fragile CPR game with decreasing
r(xT ), and player-specific prospect-theoretic preferences.
• For all continuous functions w(xNE(t), t), there exists a
tax rate t∗ ∈ [0, t¯] that maximizes w(xNE(t), t).
• For any given level of utilization x∗ ∈ [0, x0
NE
], there
exists a tax rate t ∈ [0, t¯] such that x∗ = xt
NE
. Specifically,
there exists a tax rate t∗ such that x0
OPT
= xt
∗
NE
. In addition,
for any x∗ > x0
NE
, there does not exist a positive tax rate
that achieves it.
Proof: The first statement follows from Proposition 7 and
the extreme value theorem. Furthermore, Proposition 2 states
that x0
OPT
≤ x0
NE
. Therefore, the second part follows from the
monotonicity and continuity of utilization in the tax rate stated
in Proposition 5 and Proposition 7, respectively.
In other words, any desired utilization x∗ ∈ [0, x0
NE
] can be
achieved by an appropriate choice of tax rate.
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Our discussion thus far assumes that the central authority
imposes an identical tax rate t on every player. In the following
section, we compare the utilization when the central authority
imposes different tax rates on different players with the
utilization under a uniform tax rate for all players.
IX. UNIFORM VERSUS DIFFERENTIATED TAX RATES
In order to isolate the effect of differentiated tax rates, we
assume that all players have identical loss aversion indices k >
1 and α = 1. Specifically, we show that the total investment at
the PNE is smaller when all players are charged an identical
tax rate, compared to the PNE of a game where tax rates are
heterogeneous.
Without loss of generality, let the tax rate imposed on player
i be γit where γi ∈ [0, 1] is referred to as her tax sensitivity.
Let Si,t ⊆ [0, 1] be the interval such that r(xT ) − γit ≥ 0
for xT ∈ Si,t. We also define fˆ(xT ) := r(xT )(1 − p(xT )) −
kp(xT ), and v(xT ) := 1 + (k − 1)p(xT ) for xT ∈ [0, 1].
Following equation (4), the expected utility of player i at a
strategy profile with xT ∈ Si,t is given by
E(ui(xi,x−i)) = xi(r(xT )− γit)(1− p(xT ))
− k(1 + γit)xip(xT )
= xifi(xT , t) = [fˆ(xT )− γitv(xT )]. (16)
Remark 4: Our results on PNE existence and uniqueness
rely on the uniqueness, continuity and monotonicity properties
of the best response. These properties remain unchanged with
a linear scaling of the tax rate, and accordingly a PNE exists
and is unique when the utilities are defined as in (16).
Remark 5: Note that γi can be viewed as the sensitivity
of player i to the tax rate t. Impacts of tax sensitivities on
price of anarchy in congestion games was studied recently in
[30], outside of the context of behavioral risk attitudes. Player-
specific tax sensitivities can arise when players have different
reference utilities. In particular, the utility in (16) arises if the
reference utility of player i is −(1−γi)txi. In this case, player
i perceives her tax payment as part of her reference utility as
opposed to considering it entirely as a loss. If γi = 0, the
results are the same as the case without taxation. If γi = 1,
then we have the identical setting as the previous sections.
We now consider the family Γm of fragile CPR games
with n players each with α = 1 and k > 1, r(xT ) and
p(xT ) satisfying Assumption 1, and the mean of the tax
sensitivities is γm ∈ [0, 1]. With a slight abuse of notation, we
sometimes refer a player with sensitivity γm as player m. Let
t¯m := sup{t ≥ 0|maxxT∈Sm,t fm(xT , t) > 0}. The following
result holds for both increasing and decreasing rate of return
functions. The main ideas behind the proof is analogous to the
ideas used in the proof of Theorem 5 in [28].
Proposition 8: Let t ∈ [0, t¯m). Let ΓM ∈ Γm be the game
where the sensitivity parameter is γm for every player. Then,
among all games in Γm, CPR utilization is smallest in ΓM .
Proof: Let ΓH ∈ Γm be a Fragile CPR game where
the sensitivity parameters (γi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) are player-
specific. Without loss of generality, let 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ . . . ≤
γn ≤ 1, with
∑n
i=1 γi = nγm. Furthermore, let the utilizations
at the respective PNEs of ΓH and ΓM be xH and xM .
Suppose xH = 0. Then, we have fˆ(xT )−γ1tv(xT ) ≤ 0 for
xT ∈ S1,t. Since γm ≥ γ1, we also have fˆ(xT )−γmtv(xT ) ≤
0 for xT ∈ Sm,t, which implies xM = 0. Since t < t¯m, the
case xH = 0 does not arise.
Therefore, xH > 0. For j /∈ Supp(ΓH), we have
fˆ(xH)− γjtv(xH) ≤ 0 =⇒ fˆ(xH)− γtv(xH) ≤ 0,
for every γ ≥ γj . Therefore, Supp(ΓH) consists of a set of
players with smallest sensitivity parameters. Since xH > 0,
player 1 ∈ Supp(ΓH). From equation (10) for ΓH , we have
xH =
∑
i∈Supp(ΓH )
gi(xH , t) =
n∑
i=1
max(gi(xH , t), 0)
=
n∑
i=1
max
(
fˆ(xH)− γitv(xH)
−fˆ ′(xH) + γitv′(xH)
, 0
)
=:
n∑
i=1
max(hxH ,t(γi), 0),
where hxH ,t(·) is a function of the tax sensitivity γ at a given
total investment xH and tax rate t. Note that, since the players
are loss averse, we have v′(xH) = (k − 1)p′(xH) > 0. As
a result, for γ ≥ γ1, the numerator of hxH ,t(γ) is strictly
decreasing in γ, while the denominator is strictly increasing
in γ. We now define an interval J ⊆ [γ1, 1] as follows.
If hxH ,t(1) > 0, then J = [γ1, 1]. Otherwise, J = [γ1, γ¯),
where γ¯ ≤ 1 is the unique tax sensitivity at which hxH ,t(γ¯) =
0, and every player i ∈ Supp(ΓH) satisfies γi ∈ J . For γ ∈
J , we have fˆ(xH)−γtv(xH) > 0 and −fˆ ′(xH)+γtv′(xH) >
0, which implies
fˆ(xH)v
′(xH) > γtv(xH)v
′(xH) > fˆ
′(xH)v(xH). (17)
For γ ∈ J , straightforward calculations yield
h′xH ,t(γ) =
t(fˆ ′(xH)v(xH)− fˆ(xH)v′(xH))
(−fˆ ′(xH) + γtv′(xH))2
< 0,
h′′xH ,t(γ) =
−2v′(xH)t2(fˆ ′(xH)v(xH)− fˆ(xH)v′(xH))
(−fˆ ′(xH) + γtv′(xH))3
.
Following (17), we have h′′xH ,t(γ) > 0 for γ ∈ J . Therefore,
max(hxH ,t(γ), 0) is continuous and convex for γ ∈ [γ1, 1].
Applying Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
xH =
n∑
i=1
max(hxH ,t(γi), 0) ≥ nmax(hxH ,t(γm), 0).
We now consider two cases. First, suppose hxH ,t(γm) ≤ 0.
Note that −fˆ ′(xH) + γmtv′(xH) > 0 (since γm ≥ γ1 and
v′(xH) > 0). Thus, we have fˆ(xH)− γmtv(xH) ≤ 0. When
r(xT ) is decreasing, it is easy to see that fˆ(xT )−γmtv(xT ) <
0 for xT ∈ (xH , 1]. For an increasing and concave r(xT ),
fˆ(xT )− γmtv(xT ) is strictly concave in xT . Since fˆ ′(xH)−
γmtv
′(xH) < 0 and fˆ(xH)−γmtv(xH) ≤ 0, we have fˆ(xT )−
γmtv(xT ) < 0 for xT ∈ (xH , 1]. Thus, xM ≤ xH .
Now suppose hxH ,t(γm) > 0, i.e., fˆ(xH)− γmtv(xH) > 0
and fˆ ′(xH) − γmtv′(xH) < 0. Assume on the contrary that
xM > xH . Thus, we have [xH , xM ] ⊂ Itm, where I
t
m is the
interval defined in Lemma 1 for a playerm with tax sensitivity
γm at tax rate t. Following Lemma 2, we obtain
xH ≥ nhxH ,t(γm) = ngm(xH , t) > ngm(xM , t) = xM ,
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which is a contradiction. Therefore, xH ≥ xM .
The above result shows that when players are risk averse
with α = 1, charging different tax rates to different players
leads to higher utilization and fragility of the CPR. Since
players with identical loss aversion indices make identical
investments in the CPR, our result suggests that a central
authority should impose similar tax rates on players who make
similar investments at the equilibria without taxation.
The analysis is significantly more involved when α < 1.
On the other hand, since the utilities are continuous in α, we
should expect the above result to hold when α is close to 1.
We conclude with the following remark.
Remark 6: In addition to utilization, another important
quantity of interest to the central authority is the revenue,
defined as
∑n
i=1 γixi,NE. Straightforward calculations show
that the function γhxH ,t(γ) defined in the above proof is
concave in γ. Therefore, if the support of both games ΓH
and ΓM contain all n players, then it can be shown that the
revenue is higher in ΓM , even though utilization is lower.
X. CONCLUSION
We investigated the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism
in controlling the utilization of a failure-prone shared resource
under prospect-theoretic risk preferences of users. We first
showed the existence and uniqueness of PNE in Fragile CPR
games under taxation. We then showed that for resources
that exhibit network effects, heterogeneous prospect-theoretic
utilities of the players can lead to increase in utilization and
fragility with higher tax rates, and the utilization at the Nash
equilibrium can be discontinuous in the tax rate. In contrast,
for resources with a decreasing rate of return or congestion
effects, utilization is always decreasing and continuous in the
tax rate. Building upon these insights, we identified the range
of utilization that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax
rate for both classes of resources. Finally, we showed that for
loss averse players, imposing differentiated tax rates results in
higher utilization compared to the case where all players are
charged an identical tax rate.
Our results highlight the nuances of controlling human
behavior under uncertainty, and provide compelling insights on
how to identify and control their utilization of shared systems
via economic incentives. Future work will focus on charac-
terizing revenue maximizing taxation schemes, and designing
mechanisms for human users in dynamic environments.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Prof. Siddharth Garg (NYU) for helpful discus-
sions.
REFERENCES
[1] A. R. Hota and S. Sundaram, “Controlling human utilization of shared
resources via taxes,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2016 IEEE 55th
Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 6984–6989.
[2] K.-D. Kim and P. R. Kumar, “Cyber–physical systems: A perspective
at the centennial,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. Special
Centennial Issue, pp. 1287–1308, 2012.
[3] A. Teixeira, K. C. Sou, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “Secure
control systems: A quantitative risk management approach,” IEEE
Control Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 24–45, 2015.
[4] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[5] S. V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, and S. Havlin,
“Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks,” Nature,
vol. 464, no. 7291, p. 1025, 2010.
[6] O. Yagan, D. Qian, J. Zhang, and D. Cochran, “Optimal allocation
of interconnecting links in cyber-physical systems: Interdependence,
cascading failures, and robustness,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and
Distributed Systems, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 1708–1720, 2012.
[7] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Me´dard,
“Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine adversaries,”
in INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE. IEEE, 2007, pp. 616–624.
[8] F. Vanderhaegen, “Towards increased systems resilience: New chal-
lenges based on dissonance control for human reliability in cyber-
physical&human systems,” Annual Reviews in Control, 2017.
[9] A. R. Hota, “Impacts of game-theoretic and behavioral decision-making
on the robustness and security of shared systems and networks,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Purdue University, 2017.
[10] P. B. Reverdy, V. Srivastava, and N. E. Leonard, “Modeling human de-
cision making in generalized gaussian multiarmed bandits,” Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 102, no. 4, pp. 544–571, 2014.
[11] S. Munir, J. A. Stankovic, C.-J. M. Liang, and S. Lin, “Cyber physical
system challenges for human-in-the-loop control.” in Feedback Comput-
ing, 2013.
[12] J. R. Marden and J. S. Shamma, “Game theory and distributed control,”
in Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Elsevier,
2015, vol. 4, pp. 861–899.
[13] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, vol. 47,
pp. 263–291, 1979.
[14] C. F. Camerer, G. Loewenstein, and M. Rabin, Advances in behavioral
economics. Princeton University Press, 2011.
[15] N. C. Barberis, “Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review
and assessment,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 1,
pp. 173–195, 2013.
[16] R. M. Holmes Jr, P. Bromiley, C. E. Devers, T. R. Holcomb, and J. B.
McGuire, “Management theory applications of prospect theory: Ac-
complishments, challenges, and opportunities,” Journal of Management,
vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1069–1107, 2011.
[17] A. Hota and S. Sundaram, “Interdependent security games on networks
under behavioral probability weighting,” IEEE Transactions on Control
of Network Systems (To Appear), 2018.
[18] G. El Rahi, A. Sanjab, W. Saad, N. B. Mandayam, and H. V. Poor,
“Prospect theory for enhanced smart grid resilience using distributed
energy storage,” in Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton),
2016 54th Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 248–255.
[19] V. S. S. Nadendla, E. Akyol, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “Strategic
communication between prospect theoretic agents over a gaussian test
channel,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.04956, 2017.
[20] S. R. Etesami, W. Saad, N. Mandayam, and H. V. Poor, “Stochastic
games for smart grid energy management with prospect prosumers,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (To Appear), 2018.
[21] K. Nar, L. J. Ratliff, and S. S. Sastry, “Learning prospect theory
value function and reference point of a sequential decision maker,” in
Proceedings of the 56th IEEE Confefence on Decision and Control,
2017.
[22] M. L. Katz and C. Shapiro, “Systems competition and network effects,”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 93–115, 1994.
[23] “The day the Napster died,” 2002, accessed: 2015-05-12. [Online].
Available: goo.gl/Qn4EZD
[24] N. F. Johnson, M. Zheng, Y. Vorobyeva, A. Gabriel, H. Qi, N. Velasquez,
P. Manrique, D. Johnson, E. Restrepo, C. Song, and S. Wuchty, “New
online ecology of adversarial aggregates: ISIS and beyond,” Science,
vol. 352, no. 6292, pp. 1459–1463, 2016.
[25] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Algorithmic
game theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[26] A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin, “Competitive routing in multiuser
communication networks,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 510–521, 1993.
[27] E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, games, and common-pool
resources. University of Michigan Press, 1994.
[28] A. R. Hota, S. Garg, and S. Sundaram, “Fragility of the commons
under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes,” Games and Economic Behavior,
vol. 98, pp. 135–164, 2016.
12
[29] J. Delaney and S. Jacobson, “Payments or persuasion: common pool re-
source management with price and non-price measures,” Environmental
and Resource Economics, pp. 1–26, 2015.
[30] P. N. Brown and J. R. Marden, “Optimal mechanisms for robust
coordination in congestion games,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control (To Appear), 2018.
[31] C. Swamy, “The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for
network congestion games,” ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG),
vol. 8, no. 4, p. 36, 2012.
[32] P. N. Brown and J. R. Marden, “The robustness of marginal-cost taxes
in affine congestion games,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 62, no. 8, pp. 3999–4004, 2017.
[33] T. Roughgarden and F. Schoppmann, “Local smoothness and the price
of anarchy in splittable congestion games,” Journal of Economic Theory,
vol. 156, pp. 317–342, 2015.
[34] J. M. Walker and R. Gardner, “Probabilistic destruction of common-pool
resources: Experimental evidence,” The Economic Journal, vol. 102, no.
414, pp. 1149–1161, 1992.
[35] D. V. Budescu, A. Rapoport, and R. Suleiman, “Common pool resource
dilemmas under uncertainty: qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions,”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 171–201, 1995.
[36] K. Paridari, A. Parisio, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “Demand
response for aggregated residential consumers with energy storage
sharing,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual
Conference on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 2024–2030.
[37] E. A. Ok, Real analysis with economic applications. Princeton
University Press, 2007, vol. 10.
[38] D. Fotakis, G. Karakostas, and S. G. Kolliopoulos, “On the existence of
optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users.”
SAGT, vol. 10, pp. 162–173, 2010.
[39] R. Kruse and J. Deely, “Joint continuity of monotonic functions,” The
American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 74–76, 1969.
[40] W. W. Hogan, “Point-to-set maps in mathematical programming,” SIAM
Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 591–603, 1973.
APPENDIX A
SOCIAL WELFARE
Following the convention in the game theory literature [25],
we define the social welfare at a strategy profile x ∈ [0, 1]n
and a given tax rate t ∈ [0, t¯) as
Ψ(x) =
∑
i∈N
Eui(xi, x−i) =
∑
i∈N
xαii fi(xT , t), (18)
where ui is defined in (2). Due to the continuity of Ψ, there
always exists a social welfare maximizing set of investments.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall from Assumption 1 that
t¯ > 0. Therefore, at t = 0, there exists a player k with
maxxT∈[0,1] fk(xT , 0) > 0. As a result, Ψ(xOPT) > 0. In the
rest of the proof, we omit the superscript 0 and the second
argument from f for better readability.
Now, assume on the contrary that xOPT > xNE. Then there
exists a player i with respective CPR investments satisfying
xi,OPT > xi,NE > 0.
First we claim that fi(xOPT) > 0. Suppose otherwise,
and let j be a different player with fj(xOPT) > 0.
6 Let
ǫ ∈ [0, xi,OPT), and consider a different strategy profile
xˆOPT = (x1,OPT, . . . , xi,OPT − ǫ, . . . , xj,OPT + ǫ, . . . , xn,OPT) with
total utilization xOPT. Then
(xi,OPT)
αifi(xOPT) + (xj,OPT)
αjfj(xOPT)
< (xi,OPT − ǫ)
αifi(xOPT) + (xj,OPT + ǫ)
αjfj(xOPT)
=⇒ Ψ(xOPT) < Ψ(xˆOPT),
6Note that such a player always exists; otherwise we have fj(xOPT) ≤ 0
for every player j, which implies Ψ(xOPT) ≤ 0.
since fi(xOPT) < 0 and fj(xOPT) > 0. This contradicts the
optimality of xOPT.
Since xOPT > xNE and fi(xOPT) > 0, xOPT ∈ Ii, where
Ii is the interval defined in Lemma 1. From the first order
optimality condition for player i at the PNE (8), we obtain
xi,NEfi,x(xNE) + αifi(xNE) = 0
=⇒ xi,OPT > xi,NE =
αifi(xNE)
−fi,x(xNE)
>
αifi(xOPT)
−fi,x(xOPT)
=⇒ αifi(xOPT) + xi,OPTfi,x(xOPT) < 0,
where fi,x(xT ) =
∂fi
∂xT
(xT ), and the second inequality in the
second line follows from Lemma 2.
We now show that for every player j other than i,
x
αj
j,OPTfj,x(xOPT) ≤ 0. For decreasing rate of return functions,
this is true since f(·) is strictly decreasing in the total
investment. On the other hand, for increasing rate of return
functions, we have the following two cases.
Case 1: maxxT∈[0,1] fj(xT ) > 0. Following the discussion
in Lemma 1, we have xNE > zj in this case. Therefore,
fj,x(xNE) < 0. Furthermore, f(·) is concave (following
Lemma 1), and xOPT > xNE, which implies fj,x(xOPT) < 0.
Case 2: maxxT∈[0,1] fj(xT ) ≤ 0. Following identical argu-
ments as the second paragraph of the proof, we have xj,OPT = 0
in this case.
We are now ready to complete the proof. From the first
order optimality condition for the social optimum, we obtain
0 =
∂Ψ
∂xi
∣∣∣
x=xOPT
= αix
αi−1
i,OPT [xi,OPTfi,x(xOPT) + fi(xOPT)]
+
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
x
αj
j,OPTfj,x(xOPT) < 0,
following the above discussion. This contradicts our initial
claim, and we must have xOPT ≤ xNE.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS PERTAINING TO MONOTONICITY OF UTILIZATION
Proof of Lemma 5.When it is clear from the context, we omit
the arguments xT , t and i in the following analysis for better
readability. We now state the effective rate of return function
under taxation, and compute its derivatives with respect to xT
and t. Let t ∈ [0, t¯) and xT ∈ (at, 1]. Recall that r(·) is
strictly increasing and concave, and p(·) is strictly increasing
and convex. From (4), we have
f(xT , t) = (r − t)
α(1− p)− k(1 + t)αp (19)
=⇒ fx(xT , t) =
∂f
∂xT
(xT , t) = α(r − t)
α−1r′(1− p)
− (r − t)αp′ − k(1 + t)αp′. (20)
Differentiating f(xT , t) with respect to t for t ∈ {t ≥ 0|xT ∈
(at, 1]}, we obtain
ft(xT , t) =
∂f
∂t
(xT , t) = −α(r − t)
α−1(1− p)
− αk(1 + t)α−1p, and (21)
fx,t(xT , t) =
∂2f
∂xT∂t
(xT , t) = −α(α− 1)(r − t)
α−2r′(1− p)
+ α(r − t)α−1p′ − αk(1 + t)α−1p′. (22)
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Since ∂g
∂t
=
ffx,t−fxft
f2x
, we now compute
ffx,t = −α(α− 1)(r − t)
2α−2r′(1− p)2
+ α(r − t)2α−1(1− p)p′
− αk(r − t)α(1 + t)α−1p′(1− p)
− αk(r − t)α−1(1 + t)αpp′
+ α(α− 1)k(r − t)α−2r′(1 + t)αp(1− p)
+ αk2(1 + t)2α−1pp′.
Similarly,
fxft = −α
2(r − t)2α−2r′(1 − p)2
+ α(r − t)2α−1(1 − p)p′
− α2k(r − t)α−1r′(1 + t)α−1p(1− p)
+ αk(r − t)α(1 + t)α−1pp′
+ αk(r − t)α−1(1 + t)αp′(1− p)
+ αk2(1 + t)2α−1pp′.
From the above analysis, we obtain
ffx,t − fxft
=α(r − t)2α−2r′(1− p)2 − αk(r − t)α−1(1 + t)αp′
− αk(r − t)α(1 + t)α−1p′
+ α2k(r − t)α−1r′(1 + t)α−1p(1− p)
+ α(α − 1)k(r − t)α−2r′(1 + t)αp(1− p) (23)
=α(α − 1)k(r − t)α−2r′(1 + t)αp(1− p)
− αk(r − t)α−1(1 + t)α−1p′(r + 1)
+ α(r − t)α−1r′(1− p)
× [(r − t)α−1(1− p) + αk(1 + t)α−1p]. (24)
Since α < 1, and r′ > 0, the first term in (24) is negative.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for ffx,t − fxft < 0 is
k(1 + t)α−1p′(r + 1)
> r′(1− p)[(r − t)α−1(1− p) + αk(1 + t)α−1p]
⇐⇒ k(1 + t)α−1[(r + 1)p′ − αr′(1− p)p]
> r′(r − t)α−1(1− p)2
⇐⇒ k >
r′(1− p)2
(r + 1)p′ − αr′(1− p)p
(
1 + t
r − t
)1−α
= q(xT , t).
Now let xT ∈ It. Therefore, fx(xT , t) < 0, and accordingly
we have
0 < fp′ − fx = (r − t)
α(1 − p)p′
− α(r − t)α−1r′(1− p)p+ (r − t)αpp′
= (r − t)α−1[(r − t)p′ − αr′p(1− p)]
=⇒ (r + 1)p′ > αr′p(1− p).
It remains to show that at a given t, q(xT , t) is mono-
tonically decreasing in xT for xT ∈ (at, 1]. Specifically, let
l1 := r
′(1− p)2 and l2 := (r + 1)p′ − αr′(1− p)p > 0. Then
l′1 = r
′′(1− p)2 − 2r′(1− p)p′ < 0, and
l′2 = (r + 1)p
′′ + r′p′ − αr′′p(1− p)− αr′p′(1− p) + αr′p′p
= (r + 1)p′′ − αr′′p(1− p) + r′p′(1− α+ 2αp) > 0.
Therefore, the numerator of q(xT , t) is decreasing in xT ,
and the denominator is positive and increasing in xT .
Proof of Lemma 6. Let k¯ := k(1 + t)α, and k¯t := kα(1 +
t)α−1. From (23), we obtain
ffx,t − ftfx
=α(r − t)2α−2r′(1− p)2 − (r − t)αk¯tp
′
− α(1 − α)(r − t)α−2r′k¯p(1− p)
+ α(r − t)α−1r′k¯t(1− p)p− α(r − t)
α−1k¯p′
=α(1 − p)r′(r − t)α−2[(r − t)α(1− p)− (1 − α)k¯p
+ (r − t)k¯tp]− α(r − t)
α−1k¯p′ − (r − t)αk¯tp
′
=α(1 − p)r′(r − t)α−2[f + αk¯p+ (r − t)k¯tp]
− α(r − t)α−1k¯p′ − (r − t)αk¯tp
′ < 0,
when r′ < 0 and f > 0. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS PERTAINING TO CONTINUITY OF UTILIZATION
A. Preliminaries
As stated earlier, our proofs largely rely on Berge’s maxi-
mum theorem which we state below.
Theorem 3 (from [37]): Let Θ and X be two metric spaces,
and let C : Θ⇒ X be a compact-valued correspondence. Let
the function Φ : X ×Θ→ R be jointly continuous in both X
and Θ. Define
σ(θ) := argmax
x∈C(θ)
Φ(x, θ), and
Φ∗(θ) := max
x∈C(θ)
Φ(x, θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
If C is continuous at θ ∈ Θ, then
1) σ : Θ ⇒ X is compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous
and closed at θ.
2) Φ∗ : Θ→ R is continuous at θ.
In many instances, the correspondence C takes the form of
a parametrized constraint set, i.e., C(θ) = {x ∈ X |lj(x, θ) ≤
0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}}. For this class of constraints, we have
the following sufficient conditions for the upper and lower
hemicontinuity of C [40, Theorem 10,12].
Theorem 4: Let C : Θ ⇒ X ⊆ Rk be given by C(θ) =
{x ∈ X |lj(x, θ) ≤ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}}.
1) Let X be closed, and all lj’s be continuous on X . Then,
C is upper hemicontinunous on Θ.
2) Let lj’s be continuous and convex in x for each θ. If
there exists (x, θ) such that lj(x, θ) < 0 for all j, then C
is lower hemicontinuous at θ, and in some neighborhood
of θ.
Remark 7: Some authors use the term semi-continuity or
open/closed correspondences instead of hemicontinuity [40].
The definitions coincide for closed and compact-valued corre-
spondences, which is the case in this paper.
B. Proofs pertaining to continuity under network effects
We first introduce certain notation, and prove some prelim-
inary lemmas. In appropriate places in this section, we treat
yti , z
t
i , and x
t
NE
as functions of t (from [0, t¯)→ [0, 1]), with a
slight abuse of notation. Furthermore, we denote the utilization
xT as x, and
∂fi
∂x
(x, t) as fi,x(x, t).
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Fig. 6: Illustrating the function gˆN (x, t) for a CPR with r(x) =
3x + 1, p(x) = 0.2 + 0.8x4, and t = 1.5, and a player with
α = 0.3, k = 1.5. In this example, zt = 0.4402 zˆt = 0.4502,
and yt = 0.6737. Note that g(x, t) is undefined at x = zt.
Recall from (6) and (7) that St := [0, bt] when
r(x) is strictly decreasing, and St := [at, 1] when
r(x) is strictly increasing. Furthermore, recall that t¯i :=
sup{t ≥ 0|maxx∈St fi(x, t) > 0}. For t < t¯i, z
t
i :=
argmaxx∈St fi(x, t), and y
t
i ∈ (z
t
i , 1) such that fi(y
t
i , t) = 0.
In addition, fi(x, t) is positive and decreasing for x ∈ (z
t
i , y
t
i).
We now define
zˆti := argmax
x∈[zt
i
,yt
i
]
−[αifi(x, t) + fi,x(x, t)]
2. (25)
Note that at a given t < t¯i, fi(x, t) is concave, and therefore,
αifi(x, t) + fi,x(x, t) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ [zti , y
t
i ].
Thus, zˆti = z
t
i when z
t
i = 0 and fi,x(0, t) < 0. Otherwise,
αifi(zˆ
t
i , t)+fi,x(zˆ
t
i , t) = 0. With the above quantities, we are
now ready to define the following function. For a player i,
x ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, t¯i), let
gˆNi (x, t) :=


1, x ∈ [0, zˆti),
αifi(x,t)
−fi,x(x,t)
, x ∈ [zˆti , y
t
i),
0, otherwise.
(26)
Note that gˆNi (x, t) is well-defined. It follows from (25)
that when zˆti > 0, the maximum value of
αifi(x,t)
−fi,x(x,t)
= 1
for x ∈ [zˆti , y
t
i ] occurs at x = zˆ
t
i . As a result, gˆ
N
i (x, t) is
bounded.7 In Figure 6, we illustrate the shape of the function
gˆNi (x, t), and how it compares with gi(x, t) defined in (9) for
the CPR with the same characteristics as Example 4. Note that
the denominator of gi(x, t) is 0 at x = z
t
i , while gˆ
N
i (x, t) is
bounded for x ∈ [0, 1] as it is defined in terms of zˆti .
We first establish the continuity of zti ,zˆ
t
i , and y
t
i , and then
prove the (joint) continuity of gˆNi (·, ·).
Lemma 9: When viewed as functions of t, zti ,zˆ
t
i , and y
t
i are
continuous in t for t ∈ [0, t¯i).
Proof: With a slight abuse of notation, we view the set
St as a correspondence S : [0, t¯i)⇒ [0, 1] with S(t) := {x ∈
[0, 1]|t− r(x) ≤ 0}. Recall that zti := argmaxx∈S(t) fi(x, t);
zti is single-valued since fi(x, t) is strictly concave in x ∈ S(t)
at a given t. Since r(x) is continuous, concave, and for every
t ∈ t¯i, t − r(1) < 0, it follows from Theorem 4 that S(t)
is both upper and lower hemicontinuous. Note that fi(x, t) is
defined for x ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, t¯i), and is jointly continuous in
7If we had defined the range of x to be [zti , y
t
i) in the second line of (26),
then the denominator of gˆNi (x, t) would be 0 at x = z
t
i .
x and t. Therefore, following Berge’s maximum theorem, zti
is continuous in t.
Recall that yti ∈ [z
t
i , 1] such that fi(z
t
i , t) = 0. Furthermore,
fi(x, t) is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ (zti , 1]. Therefore,
we can alternatively let yti := argmaxx∈[zti ,1]−(fi(x, t))
2.
Since zti is continuous in t, the correspondence t⇒ [z
t
i , 1] is
continuous following Theorem 4. Berge’s maximum theorem
now implies that yti is continuous in t.
Following the above discussion, we have t ⇒ [zti , y
t
i ]
as continuous. From its definition (25), zˆti is the unique
maximizer of a function that is jointly continuous in both x and
t. Once again, from Berge’s maximum theorem, we conclude
that zˆti is continuous in t.
Lemma 10: The function gˆi(x, t), x ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, t¯)
defined in (15) is jointly continuous in x and t.
Proof: First observe that at a given t, gˆi(x, t) is con-
tinuous and monotone in x for x ∈ [0, 1]. In particular,
gˆi(y
t
i , t) = fi(y
t
i , t) = 0, and the monotonicity follows from
Lemma 2. Following [39], it now suffices to show that gˆi(x, t)
is continuous in t at a given x. However, this is true because
zˆti and y
t
i are continuous in t following Lemma 9, together
with
αifi(zˆ
t
i ,t)
−fi,x(zˆti ,t)
= 1, and
αifi(y
t
i ,t)
−fi,x(yti ,t)
= 0.
We now show that the total PNE investment can be stated
as a maximizer of a function that is continuous in both the
total investment and the tax rate.
Lemma 11: For x ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0,mini∈N t¯i), define
hN (x, t) := −[x−
∑
i∈N
gˆNi (x, t)]
2.
Then, at a given t, argmaxx∈[0,1] h
N(x, t) is single-valued,
and is equal to xt
NE
.
Proof: From its definition, hN (x, t) ≤ 0. Suppose there
exists xt ∈ [0, 1] such that hN (xt, t) = 0, or equivalently
xt =
∑
i∈N gˆ
N
i (x
t, t). First we claim that xt > zˆtj for every
player j. If this is not the case, then for a player j with xt ≤ zˆtj ,
we have gˆNj (x
t, t) = 1 which implies xt <
∑
i∈N gˆ
N
i (x
t, t).
Now consider the strategy profile {xtj}j∈N where x
t
j =
gˆNj (x
t, t) for each player j. Consider a player j with xt ≥ ytj .
Then, xtj = gˆ
N
j (x
t, t) = 0. Following Lemma 1, the strategy of
player j, xtj , is her best response. Now suppose x
t < ytj . From
the definition of gˆN (·, ·), we have xtjfj,x(x
t, t)+αjfj(x
t, t) =
0. Following (8), the investment of player j satisfies the first
order optimality condition for her utility. Furthermore, the
proof of Lemma 2 in [28] showed that the utility of player j
is strictly concave in the range of investments which contains
the investment at which the first order optimality condition is
satisfied. Therefore, xtj is the unique best response of player j
for the given strategies of others. Thus, {xti}i∈N corresponds
to a PNE strategy profile.
Recall that a PNE exists, and is unique. Following Theorem
1 in [28], the total investment at the PNE is unique as well.
Therefore, there is a unique x = xt
NE
with hN (x, t) = 0, which
also maximizes hN (x, t) at a given t.
The proof of Proposition 6 now follows from Berge’s
maximum theorem as shown below.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof: Let C : [0,mini∈N t¯i) ⇒ [0, 1]. From its def-
inition, C is compact-valued, and is both upper and lower
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hemicontinuous at every t ∈ [0,mini∈N t¯i). From Lemma
10, hN (x, t) is jointly continuous in x and t. Following
Berge’s maximum theorem, argmaxx∈C(t) h
N (x, t) is upper
hemicontinuous. From Lemma 11, hN (x, t) is single-valued.
Therefore, xNE(t) is continuous in t for t ∈ [0,mini∈N t¯i).
